Mr Fico, 49, is a two-time prime minister and was hoping to take over his country’s largely ceremonial presidency. That would have made him the dominant politician in the country of 5.4m. As president he would still be able to steer his centre-left Smer party, which has 83 seats in the 150-member parliament, and also have a crucial voice in the selection of judicial and other administrative posts.
In the event, he managed to take only 40.6 per cent of the vote in the second round of presidential elections, with Mr Kiska winning an overwhelming 59.4 per cent.
“People didn’t support the concentration of power in Fico’s hands,” said Grigorij Meseznikov, head of the Institute for Public Affairs, a Bratislava think tank. Slovakia had already seen the excesses caused by the concentration of too much power at the top in the authoritarian rule of Vladimir Meciar in the 1990s. There is also the example of the controversial government of Viktor Orban in neighbouring Hungary, which has bent democratic rules thanks to its grip on power.
Mr Kiska is a self-made businessman who sold two consumer finance companies and then founded a respected charity that helps the seriously ill. Although he is an inexperienced politician, Mr Kiska managed to united the normally fractious centre-right opposition around his candidacy in the second round, easily defeating Mr Fico.
His victory does provide a bit of check on Mr Fico’s powers, as it will be more difficult for Smer to appoint loyalist judges. The importance of that could be seen in the waning days of the presidency of Ivan Gasparovic, who is under pressure to appoint the new head of the supreme court before leaving office.
Mr Kiska also has the power to veto legislation, although that can be over-ridden by a simple parliamentary majority, something that will be very easy for Mr Fico to marshal.
“Kiska has been positioning himself as an opponent of the Smer government and he would likely be a vocal critic of the centre-left cabinet,” wrote Otilia Dhand of Teneo Intelligence. “Given the symbolic role of the president, Kiska would have a very limited policy impact, but his victory would have a significant symbolic meaning as the first personal defeat for Fico.”
Mr Fico has been lying low ever since his defeat in late March, but he is unlikely to embark on a radical shift in economic policy, largely because the country is in the midst of a sharp recovery after last year’s slowdown.
The economy grew by only 0.9 per cent last year, but is expected to accelerate to about 2.3 per cent in 2014 and to exceed 3 per cent next year, one of the fastest growth rates in the EU.
Slovakia’s recovery is due to a revival in the eurozone, and particularly Germany, the destination of most of the cars and electronics being churned out by Slovak factories. Domestic demand is also showing signs of life.
“We are seeing encouraging signs in terms of domestic demand,” said Vladimir Vano, CEE economist for Sberbank Europe. “After sinking for many years, domestic demand seems to have found bottom, helped by record low inflation and a stabilisation of the labour market.”
The biggest problem for Mr Fico is the persistently high level of unemployment, currently 13.5 per cent. It was one of the main reasons for the lack of enthusiasm for his presidential candidacy among his core electorate.
However, he has little room for manoeuvre as Slovakia’s debt is expected to pass 55 per cent of GDP this year, triggering a measure that will force the government to cut spending by 3 per cent in the 2015 budget. If the debt level breaches 57 per cent of GDP (it ended 2013 at about 53 per cent) then the government will be forced to present a balanced budget – necessitating politically unpopular spending cuts on the eve of parliamentary elections scheduled for 2016.
This is where Mr Fico’s loss in the presidential elections will hurt the most. Slovak laws calls for the debt brake rules to be suspended for two years in the event that a new government is named – something that would have happened had Mr Fico become president.
Now he will have to bear the political price of battling public debt while trying to maintain his public support.
