Ukrainian dire need for gas industry reform

Ukraine buys gas in Europe for four times higher price than the one offered by the Russian state gas giant Gazprom. But the Gazprom-Naftogaz problems go beyond the prices and gas exports.
Ukrainian dire need for gas industry reform

(Naftogaz Ukrayiny, Public domain)

Ukraine began to reform its gas sector, but also seeks to resolve the problems in the east of the country and tries to prevent the construction of Nord Stream 2 in the Baltic, which would bypass Ukraine and significantly reduce Ukraine’s profits from gas transit from Russia to Europe. Reforms have slowed down due to the lack of political will among the Ukrainian authorities. Slow reforms and quarrels within the government, as well as among the management of state energy company Naftogaz, have a negative impact on the already tarnished image of Ukraine in the world. These factors can lead to a situation in which transporting gas through Ukraine will no longer be considered a good alternative to a new gas pipelines of Gazprom. Diplomatic activities around Ukraine might stop overnight after the release of the Nord Stream 2 (read more about the future of Nord Stream 2). This could lead to significant geopolitical tension, especially after the Danes showed that they can stop the passage of the pipeline through Danish territorial waters, which is part of the idea of ​​connecting Norway and Poland, and reducing the dependence of Middle Eastern Europe on Russian gas.

The reform of the Ukrainian state monopoly Naftogaz is one of the most difficult and most important challenge for the Ukrainian authorities. The reform is needed mainly because of the serious economic problems Ukraine faces. Naftogaz’s deficit was covered by the state budget in 2014 and amounted to more than 6 per cent of the country’s GDP. Together with the ongoing crisis the Ukrainian macroeconomic stability was basically grounded. In the period between 2014 and 2015, Kiev had to seek financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund twice . Restructuring Naftogaz then became one of the main demands of the IMF (read more).

Naftogaz is the largest Ukrainian corporation in the energy sector, and with its subcontractors (including gas extraction, storage and transportation companies) is also the largest taxpayer in the country. According to the restructuring plan adopted by the government in July 2016 and based on the third energy package agreed with the European Union, Naftogaz would have to break down into several corporate units to stop the monopoly. According to the agreement, Naftogaz will spin-off gas pipelines and underground warehouses to a new company that will be governed by the Ministry of Energy and the Coal Industry. This move aims to create a transparent and competitive gas market and could therefore become attractive to foreign investment. Among those interested in maintaining gas transit over the Ukrainian territory are operators from Italy and Slovakia, who can help in the future modernization of the Ukrainian gas network.

An important component of Naftogaz’s reform is the liberalization of gas prices for households. The maintenance of state prices below market value led to a gradual increase in company debts, and the government covered these losses. Regular monitoring of the prices was another IMF’s requirement. Between 2014 and 2017, the government has increased prices for individual consumers nearly ten times, but the price is still lower than the market one, favouring inefficient gas consumption and corruption, as gas sales are performed through intermediaries that do not provide accurate gas consumption data. It is estimated that the system generates losses of about EUR1.3bn a year.

Recently, Naftogaz has recovered somewhat, so in 2017 it paid almost EUR3bn in taxes and dividends, accounting for almost 14 per cent of state budget revenues, but this has boosted the internal political struggle for corporate control and its financial gains. In 2016, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade tried to take control of Ukrtranshaz, one of the most profitable sub-units of Naftogaz, which manages transport and storage of gas. This move was contrary to Naftogaz’s restructuring plan as agreed with the Energy Community and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, i.e. with the Bank’s Financial Aid Agreement. In the end, the ministry dropped its claim because international financial institutions threatened to stop financial aid.

Restructuring has led to clashes between the government and the Naftogaz management because they are accusing each other of attempts to sabotage proceedings and business. The government decided to slow down with the establishment of new gas transmission companies, and Naftogaz has created a new branch within Ukrtranshaza. The management even went further in trying to work independently and hired a financial advisory firm that is part of Rothschild & Co. in order to help with the restructuring and finding foreign investors. In response, the government blocked Naftogaz in direct negotiations with investors. The creation of new companies has also slowed down due to the process before the Stockholm Arbitration Tribunal where Naftogaz and Gazprom contend. The Tribunal ruled in favor of Naftogaz and decided that Gazprom will have to make a net payment of USD2.56bn to Naftogaz. Gazprom filed an appeal saying that there were „significant procedural irregularities committed by arbitrators during adoption of this decision”.

Now nothing prevents the emergence of new companies – except the government. There is no political will to complete the restructuring, as these firms will play a significant role in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019. It is unclear whether Kiev will allow another increase in household prices, precisely because the government is afraid of losing votes. But, on the other hand, the continuation of Naftogaz’s restructuring is extremely important for getting support from international financial institutions. Despite the positive decision of the Arbitral Tribunal for Ukraine and the possibility of additional financing on the capital market arises, the government could keep control and discourage investment in the Ukrainian gas pipeline system.

(Naftogaz Ukrayiny, Public domain)

Otwarta licencja


Tags


Related articles

German automotive industry at a crossroads

Category: Business
"If the auto industry collapses, Germany will collapse," writes Gabo Steingart emphatically in a recent article in Focus magazine. Many experts and commentators are increasingly drawing attention to the waning strength of Germany's flagship industry. German automotive has missed the electric age. Is it just a slightly longer pit-stop or is it irretrievably losing "pole position"?
German automotive industry at a crossroads

Niski i zróżnicowany poziom kompetencji finansowych na świecie

Category: Analizy
Definiując pojęcie kompetencji finansowych (financial literacy), warto odwołać się do podejścia zaproponowanego przez Organizację Współpracy Gospodarczej i Rozwoju (OECD). Jest ono bowiem na świecie powszechnie akceptowane i wykorzystywane w badaniach. Przez kompetencje finansowe należy rozumieć „kombinację świadomości, wiedzy, umiejętności, postaw i zachowań niezbędnych do podejmowania skutecznych decyzji finansowych i ostatecznego osiągania indywidualnego dobrobytu finansowego” (OECD/INFE Guidance on digital delivery of financial education, OECD 2022). Nawet z bardzo pobieżnej analizy tej definicji widać, że pojęcie kompetencji finansowych jest wielowątkowe i zawiera kilka wzajemnie uzupełniających się komponentów.
Niski i zróżnicowany poziom kompetencji finansowych na świecie

Dużo pieniędzy, mało kapitału i niewiele reform – zawirowania na rynku bankowym w 2023 roku

Category: Instytucje finansowe
Wydarzenia z marca 2023 r. w Stanach Zjednoczonych i Szwajcarii uwidoczniły – nie po raz pierwszy – utrzymującą się kruchość systemów bankowych. Autorzy najnowszego Raportu genewskiego na temat gospodarki światowej oceniają, czy dotychczasowe reformy wystarczą, aby stawić czoło zmianom otoczenia gospodarczego i postępującym przekształceniom strukturalnym oraz jakie dodatkowe reformy systemów bankowych mogą okazać się konieczne. Co prawda konkretne przyczyny słabości banków są różne w rozmaitych jurysdykcjach, ale wiele wniosków zawartych w raporcie dotyczy ogółu systemów bankowych.
Dużo pieniędzy, mało kapitału i niewiele reform – zawirowania na rynku bankowym w 2023 roku